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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
A.

The United States Supreme Court Tackles the ADA

Commentators and historians alike will label 1999 as the year
of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 in the U.S. Supreme
Court. On June 22, 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a
trilogy of decisions that better defined who is a covered employee
2
under the ADA. The central issue in all three decisions asked
whether courts should consider "mitigating measures" to
determine if a person is substantially limited in a "major life
activity" and therefore "disabled" and under the protection of the
ADA.
Congress enacted the ADA to prohibit employers from
discriminating based on the disability of an otherwise qualified
employee. 3
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) implement and
regulate certain ADA provisions.4 Although not given authority
over the ADA section containing the definition of "disability," the
term now in question, the two agencies have issued guidelines
regarding the proper interpretation of the term." Both agency
regulations state an employee's "disability" should be measured
without mitigating measures. The federal circuits differed in their
opinion on the issue.7 In the trilogy, the U.S. Supreme Court

1. See42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999); Murphy v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
3. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143; see also42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). The Act

defines disability as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2).

4. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 2145-46.
7. The Eighth Circuit, for example, decided those with correctable
conditions have a disability under the ADA. See, e.g., Doane v. City of Omaha, 115
F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997).
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contradicted the EEOC and DOJ and held the determination of
whether a person is "disabled" should be determined with
corrective measures in place.
The holding will affect a large
number of Americans, in effect shutting out most employees who
use "mitigating measures."
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,9 twin sisters with severe
myopia 0 applied for employment positions as commercial airline
pilots with United Air Lines, Inc. (United)." The myopia left the
sisters with vision no better than 20/200 without corrective lenses,
yet 20/20 or better vision with corrective lenses. 2 The sisters met
all other qualifications for the pilot positions. United rejected the
applications and informed the sisters all applicants needed
14
uncorrected vision of at least 20/100 for employment as pilots.

The sisters filed a claim in federal district court and alleged
that United discriminated against them based on their disability, in
violation of the ADA.' 5 More specifically, the sisters alleged the
myopia substantially limited them in major life activities or at least
United regarded them as having an impairment, therefore they
met the definition of "disabled" under the ADA.' 6 The district
court dismissed the sisters' complaint. ' 7 The court reasoned the
sisters could completely correct their impairments and therefore
did not have a defined "disability" under the ADA.' The Tenth
Circuit followed the district court reasoning and affirmed." 9 The
Court stated, "In making disability determinations, we are
8. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47.
9. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
10. Myopia is defined as: "An abnormal eye condition in which light rays from
distant objects are focused in front of the retina instead of on it, so that the objects
are not seen distinctly; nearsightedness." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 897 (3d ed. 1996) (emphasis supplied).
11. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143.
12. See id.
13. See id. The sisters already held positions as commercial airline pilots for
regional carriers but desired to fly for a "major" carrier like United. See Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 895 (10th Cir. 1997), affd, 119 S. Ct. 2139
(1999).
14. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143.
15. See id. The sisters went through the proper procedures, including
obtaining a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. See id.
16. See id. at 2143-44.
17. See id. at 2144.
18. See id.
19. SeeSutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902-03 (10th Cir. 1997),
affd, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
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concerned with whether the impairment affects the individual in
fact, not whether the impairment would hypothetically
affect the
20
individual without the use of corrective measures.,
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari to
resolve a circuit split on the issue. 21 The Court first considered the
question of whether the sisters were disabled under ADA section
12102 (A), namely, whether they had physical impairments limiting
them in one or more major life activities. 22 The Court stated the
answer turned on whether it should take mitigating measures into
account.23 The Court acknowledged that both EEOC and DOJ
suggested "mitigating measures" are not considered. 24 Both parties
accepted the EEOC and DOJ power to regulate generally. 25 United
argued the specific EEOC and DOJ interpretive guidelines on this
issue directly contradicted ADA language and therefore the Court
should disregard them.26 United argued that "[T]he phrase
'substantially limits one or more major life activities,'.. . requires
27
that the substantial limitations actually and presently exist.,
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, agreed.2s The
majority held the ADA mandated courts and employers to take into
account corrective measures and their effects, both positive and
negative.2 9 The majority had three different rationales for the
result.30 First, Congress couched the Act's language in the "present

indicative verb form" and required a person be presently, not
hypothetically substantially limited in order to demonstrate a
disability.
"A 'disability' exists only where an impairment

20. Id. at 902.
21. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 525 U.S. 1063 (1999). Those circuits
in tension with the Tenth Circuit held to varying degrees that disabilities should
be determined without reference to mitigating circumstances. See Bartlett v. New
York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998); Baert v. Euclid
Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1998); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859-66 (1st Cir. 1998); Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of
Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1998); Matczak v. Frankford Candy &
Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997).
22. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
23. See id.
24. Seeid. at 2145.
25. See id. at 2145-46.
26. See id. at 2146.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
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'substantially limits' a major life activity, not where it 'might,'
'could' or 'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures
were not taken."32 The Court held the ADA language was not
ambiguous and therefore persons taking medication or wearing
glasses are33 not presently "substantially limited" while taking those
measures.
Second, the Court stated a person's disability "is an
14
individualized inquiry" according to the ADA's express language.
Abandoning mitigating measures in the determination ran directly
contrary to ADA language and would require courts and employers
to speculate about how a condition "usually affects individuals." 35
Finally, the Court determined Congress did not intend to bring
such individuals under ADA protection.3 6 The Court used statistical
Congressional findings enacted with the ADA and determined
Congress envisioned persons without corrective measures as those
individuals "disabled" and under ADA protection.3 7 The majority
reasoned if Congress intended the ADA to cover all those using
corrective measures, Congress would have adopted higher
statistical numbers.38
With the major issue decided, the majority considered whether
United regarded the sisters' disabilities as substantially limiting
their ability to work, a major life activity.3 9 The Court held United
properly precluded the sisters from the specific positions of "lobal
airline pilot" and not positions in the broad class of working.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer in dissent, argued
common rules of statutory construction command that courts and
a person in past or present physical
employers
• • 41 measure
conditions.
Stevens argued a general rule of statutory
construction commands the Court to interpret the ADA in light of
the purpose Congress sought to serve in enacting the statute. 41

32. Id.at 2146.
33. See id. at 2146-47.
34. Id. at 2147; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
35. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147. The court gave the example of a diabetic
who would always be considered disabled because if he failed to take his insulin
injections he would be substantially limited in major life activities. See id.
36. See id. at 2147-48.
37. See id. Congress found 43 million Americans suffered from one or more
physical disabilities. See id. at 2147.
38. See id. at 2148-49.
39. See id. at 2149.
40. See id. at 2151.
41. See id. at 2152 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 2153.
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Congress intended the Act to protect the past and presently
disabled, a sweeping definition intended to cover all employees.
Stevens, using a hypothetical person missing an arm stated, "[I] n
my view, when an employer refuses to hire the individual 'because
of' his prosthesis, and the prosthesis in no way affects his ability to
do the job, that employer has unquestionably discriminated against
the individual in violation of the Act., 44 Stevens also argued the
majority improperly refused to examine ADA legislative history to
resolve the ambiguities. Stevens cited, among other documents, a
Senate report stating, "whether a person has a disability should be
assessed without regard to the availability of mitigation measures,
such as the reasonable accommodation or auxiliary aids." 46 Stevens
chastised the majority for what he called a "crabbed vision" and
argued the ADA clearly covered such individuals.
With Sutton as the catalyst, the U.S. Supreme Court issued two
related cases on the same day. In Murphy v. United Parcel Service,

Inc.,48 the United Parcel Service (UPS) hired Vaughn Murphy, 49
a
mechanic, to work in the commercial motor vehicles department.
The position required Murphy to drive commercial motor
vehicles." Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements
mandated such a driver not have a "clinical diagnosis of high blood
pressure."51 At the time UPS hired him and unknown to UPS,
Murphy had extremely high blood pressure. 52 UPS mistakenly
granted Murphy job certification and he began work.' A review of
Murphy's file and a retest soon revealed the mistake and UPS fired
Murphy less than two months after he had begun based on the

43. See id.
44. Id. at 2154.
45. See id.
46. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989)).
47. See id. at 2161. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the
analysis used in Sutton. See Belk v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 194 F.3d 946, 950
(8th Cir. 1999) (holding employee affected by polio and required to wear a leg
brace is still "disabled" under the ADA where the leg brace's negative effects
substantially limit the employee while walking).
48. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
49. See id. at 2136.
50. See id.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 391.41(b) (6) (1994).
52. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136.
53. See id.Murphy's blood pressure actually measured 186/124 when hired.
See id. Doctors first diagnosed Murphy hypertensive at the age of ten. See id.
Unmedicated, Murphy's blood pressure measured about 250/160. See id.
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belief that the blood pressure exceeded DOT requirements. 4
Murphy brought suit under the ADA.
The district court
granted summary judgment for UPS and found Murphy not
disabled since he could use medication to lower his blood
pressure. 56 The district court found Murphy not "disabled" under
the ADA and also not "regarded as" disabled. The Tenth Circuit
58

Court of Appeals affirmed. 5

5

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.9
Justice
O'Connor, again writing for the majority, quickly answered in the
affirmative the issue of whether the disability is measured with
reference to the mitigating measures. 60 The majority ruled that
when medicated, Murphy's high blood pressure did not
substantially limit him in "any major life activity." 6 The majority
refused to consider the negative effects of the medication because
it was not an issue before the court.62 Murphy also argued he was
63
"regarded as" 11
disabled due to his high blood pressure.
An
employee is "regarded as" disabled "if a covered entity mistakenly
believes that the person's actual, nonlimiting impairment
substantially limits one or more major life activities." UPS argued
did not meet DOT standards, the only reason for his
Murphy
• . 65
dismissal.
The Court affirmed and relying heavily on its decision in
Sutton, reasoned: "[T] he undisputed record evidence demonstrates
that petitioner is, at most, regarded as unable to perform only a
particular job. This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that
petitioner is regarded as substantially limited in the major life
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 881 (D. Kan.
1996), affd, 141 F.3d 1185, No. 96-3380, 1998 WL 105933 (10th Cir. Mar. 11,
1998), affd, 119 S.Ct. 2133 (1999).
57. See Murpy, 946 F. Supp. at 881-82.
58. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 141 F.3d 1185, No. 96-3380, 1998
WL 105933 (10th Cir. Mar. 11, 1998) (unpublished judgment and order), affd,
119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999). The court of appeals used its own decision in Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997), affd, 527 U.S. 471
(1999), to make the ruling. See Murphy, 1998 WL 105933, at *2.
59. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 525 U.S. 1063 (1999).
60. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. See id.
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activity of working." 66
Again, Justices Stevens and Breyer
67
dissented.
Finally, in the last case of the trio, Albertsons, Inc., v.
Kirkingburg, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a slightly different
issue. While Sutton and Murphy decided the issue in regard to
artificial aids, such as corrective lenses and medication, in
Albertsons, the Court answered the issue with respect to the body's
natural corrective devices.6 9
Albertsons, Inc. hired Hallie
Kirkingburg as a truck driver.70 The . DOT
required
that all such
•
71
commercial drivers meet federal vision standards. Kirkingburg,
at
2
the time Albertsons hired him, suffered from amblyopia , which
left him with 20/200 vision in his left eye, however, an erroneous
doctor certification allowed Kirkingburg to meet the vision
standards. 73 Once on the job, Kirkingburg injured himself and
took leave. 4 In his attempt to return to work
• 75 after the injury,
Kirkingburg submitted to a required physical.
The examining
doctor discovered the vision problem and Albertsons fired
Kirkingburg. 6
Kirkingburg sued under the ADA. The
district court granted
• 78
the Albertson's summary judgment motion.
The district court
agreed with Albertson's argument that Kirkingburg was not
qualified without accommodations. The Ninth Circuit reversed. 0
First, the Ninth Circuit rejected Albertsons' new argument that

66.

Id. at 2139.

67. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens dissented citing his dissent in
Sutton and reaffirmed his view Murphy had a "disability" under the ADA because
the hypertension severely limited his ability to perform major life activities. See id.
68. 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
69. See id. at 2169.
70. See id. at 2165.
71. See id. The regulations required corrected vision of at least 20/40 in each
eye and distant binocular vision of at least 20/40. See id.
72. Amblyopia "is a general medical term for 'poor vision caused by abnormal
visual development secondary to abnormal visual stimulation.' See id. at 2166 n.3
(citing K. WRIGHT ET AL., PEDIATRIC OPHTHALMOLOGY AND STRABISMUS 126 (1995)).
73. See id. at 2165-66.
74. See id. at 2166.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See Kirkingburg v. Albertson's, Inc., 143 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd,
119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
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Kirkingburg was not "disabled" under the ADA.8 ' The court stated,
"Although his brain has developed subconscious mechanisms for
coping with this visual impairment and thus his body compensates
for this disability, the manner in which he sees differs significantly
from the manner in which most people see."8 2 Second, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court because Albertsons did not allow
Kirkingburg to apply for a waiver according to DOT regulations.83
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the
Court of Appeals, and held Kirkingburg was not "disabled" under
the ADA. 4 The Court stated that the proper standard under the
ADA is "significant restriction" not "significant difference."5 The
Ninth Circuit's linguistic change undercut the ADA's purpose.6
Importantly, the Court further stated the Ninth Circuit did not take
into account Kirkingburg's ability to compensate for the
deficiency. 7 The Court cited the Sutton decision and stated, "We
see no principled basis for distinguishing between measures
undertaken with artificial aids, like medications and devices, and
measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body's
own systems." 88 Accordingly, the Court ruled Kirkingburg not
"disabled" under the ADA.
In its final point, the Court rejected the waiver argument
posited by the Ninth Circuit, finding that the waiver program did
not modify the general safety visual standards and employers could
reject the program if so inclined. 90
B. ADA Damages and Social Security Benefits Can Get Along
In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., the U.S.
Supreme Court held an employee's claim for Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits did not automatically estop the
same employee from filing an ADA claim. 9' The Court held the
two claims did not inherently conflict, thus, courts should not apply
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id. at 1232.
Id.
See id. at 1235-36.
See Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2167-69.
See id. at 2168.
See id.
See id. at 2168-69.
Id. at 2169.
See id.
See id. at 2174.
526 U.S. 795, 803 (1999).
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a negative presumption when the employee files the ADA claim.
The issue arose because the SSDI program provides benefits to
those "unable to work," while the ADA protects those who with
reasonable accommodations could perform the essential functions
of the job.93

Carolyn Cleveland suffered a stroke and lost her job. Shortly
thereafter, Cleveland applied for and obtained Social Security
Disability Insurance benefits.9 On the SSDI application, Cleveland
stated she was "unable to work" because of her disability.9 6 Before
Cleveland actually received her SSDI award, 7 she filed an ADA suit
against Policy Management Systems (Policy Management), her
former employer. 9s Cleveland claimed Policy Management violated
the ADA when it failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.99
The district court granted Policy Management's summary
judgment motion based on its finding that by "applying for and
receiving SSDI benefits, [Cleveland] conceded that she was totally
disabled."'09 With this concession, Cleveland could no longer prove
she could "perform the essential functions" of the job with
"reasonable accommodations," as required by a successful ADA
claimant.10' The Fifth Circuit affirmed, yet noted that under
unusual circumstances a SSDI benefits claim and an ADA claim
may not be "necessarily be mutually exclusive.""1 2 With that
recognition, the circuit court adopted a test requiring the mere
application for or receipt of SSDI benefits created a "rebuttable
presumption" that the claimant is estopped from an ADA claim. 103

92. See id.
93. See id. at 797; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (2)
(A) (1994).
94. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 798.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. The Social Security Administration (SSA) actually first denied
Cleveland's SSDI application after her conditioned improved and she returned to
work. See id. After the termination, Cleveland asked the SSA for a reconsideration
of the SSDI benefits, the SSA then granted the benefits retroactively. See id. at 798-

99.
98. See id. at 799.
99. See id.
Cleveland claimed Policy Management denied her basic
accommodations such as training. See id.
100. Id.

101.
102.

See id.
Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys., Corp., 120 F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir.

1997), rev'd, 526 U.S. 795 (1999).

103.

See id. at 518.
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The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the4
issue.
disagreement among the Federal Courts of Appeals on the
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the circuit court decision and
held:
[T]he two claims do not inherently conflict to the point
where courts should apply a special negative presumption
like the one applied by the Court of Appeals here. That is
because there are too many situations in which an SSDI
claim and an ADA claim can comfortably exist side by
05
side."
To rationalize the holding, the Court first noted that both the
Social Security Act and the Americans with Disability Act help
disabled individuals, although differently. 01 6 The Court determined
the ADA defined a "disabled individual" in the context of a
"reasonable accommodation," a context the Social Security
Administration (SSA) does not use.'0 7 In order to process the large
number of SSDI claims, the SSA determination is more akin to a
legal conclusion.1°s The Court also stated SSDI benefits are often
given to those currently working or returning to work as a
transition back into the workforce.
Over this transition period, a
SSDI claimant's disability may improve, causing the initial SSDI
application statement to be inaccurate at a time of the ADA
claim."0 Finally, the Court used the legal system as a brace and
recognized the type of inconsistency between SSDI and ADA
positions is of the "sort normally tolerated by our legal system.""'
However, the Court did not make it that easy for claimants.
Although it struck down the "negative presumption" rule espoused
by the circuit court, the U.S. Supreme Court held a claimant that
claims an inability to work on a SSDI application, cannot ignore the
104. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 800 (1999).
105. Id. at 802-03.
106. See id. at 801. The court noted that the SSDI helps disabled persons
monetarily, while the ADA "seeks to eliminate unwarranted discrimination." Id.
107. See id. The Court stated it would be nearly impossible for the SSA to take
into account "reasonable accommodations" due to the inherently factual nature of
the issue and due to the fact the SSA receives more than 2,500,000 disability claims
every year. See id.
108. See id. at 802.
109. See id. at 805.
110. See id.
111. See id.
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2
contradiction but must "proffer a sufficient explanation" for it."
The Court remanded the case to let Cleveland offer a sufficient
explanation.13
A major victory for disability claimants, the ruling in Cleveland
now allows the "disabled" individual to find shelter under two
federal protection statutes."'

C.

The ADEA Surfaces BringingBad News for State Employees in Federal
Court

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) surfaced
in the U.S. Supreme Court in the new millennium's very first
days." 5 OnJanuary 11, 2000 the U.S. Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents," 6 which dealt a major
blow to state employees filing ADEA claims in federal court." 7 The
ADEA prohibits employers from discrimination against individuals
with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions,1 1 or
privileges of
8
employment, because of such individual's age;...,,

Upon passage of the ADEA in 1967, the Act only applied to
private employers." 9 However, in 1974, Congress, by Congressional
112. See id. The standard for this explanation to defeat summary judgment
must "be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that, assuming the
truth of, or the plaintiffs good faith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff
could nonetheless 'perform the essential functions' of her job, with or without
'reasonable accommodation.'" Id. at 807.
113. Seeid.at807.
114. As a possible indicator of the result of future cases, the Eighth Circuit has
applied Cleveland and not allowed recovery. See Loeb v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
198 F.3d 250, 1999 WL 813758, at *1-2 (8th Cir. 1999) (unpublished) (claimant
"failed to explain sufficiently how her sworn representations to SSA that she was
unable to work as of July 26, 1993, were consistent with her claim that she could
perform her job with accommodation").
115. Amazingly on the same day, the Minnesota Court of Appeals handed
down Raygor v. University of Minn., 604 N.W.2d 128, 132-33 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000) (stating the dismissal of Minnesota Human Rights Act claim and ADEA
claim in federal court did not bar state claim filed in state court).
116. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000). The Eighth Circuit passed on a similar yet different
issue: Whether Congress had the power to abrogate the state Eleventh
Amendment immunity for ADA claims. See Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d
999, 1010 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (stating Congress did not have the power to
abrogate); DeBose v. Nebraska, 186 F.3d 1087, 1088 (8th Cir. 1999) (same).
117. See Joan Biskupic, Court Curbs Suits By State Workers; Continuing a Pattern,
5-4 Ruling Bars Claims of Age Bias Under FederalLaw, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2000,
available in 2000 WL 2279421 (describing the ruling as a defeat for the nation's
five million state employees).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)(1994).
119. See Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 637.
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Congress
Amendment, extended the ADEA to the states. 20
amended 29 U.S.C. section 630(b), to include in the definition of
employer "a State or political subdivision of a State...,,121 At the
same time, Congress amended the Fair Labor and Standards Act
enforcement provisions, incorporated by reference into the ADEA,
permitting claimants to bring civil action "against any employer in
In Kimel,
any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction.
the Court determined whether Congress had the clear intent and
The
constitutional authority to abrogate state immunity.12'
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated three cases with
exactly that issue. z4 In all125 three, state agency employees filed
ADEA suits in federal court.
In Kimel, the title case, past and present faculty and librarians
the Florida
filed suit in federal district court against their
1 .. . employer,
.
126
Board of Regents, and alleged age discrimination.
The claim
centered around an alleged fund misallocation 2 to certain
1
employees with a disparate impact on older employees.1
The Florida Board of Regents (Board) moved to dismiss the29
suit.12 It based the motion on Eleventh Amendment immunity.1
The district court denied the motion and found that Congress
clearly expressed an intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
states' immunity in enacting the ADEA, and Congress had

120. See id.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 637-38. Firefighters and law enforcement officers' mandatory age
limits are exempted. See5 U.S.C. § 3307(d) (e) (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 623(j) (1994 &
Supp. III 1997).
123. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 640.
124. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998), affd,
120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
125. See MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785, 786 (N.D.
Ala. 1996). In MacPherson, two associate professors filed suit in federal district
court claiming age discrimination due to an evaluation procedure that they
claimed had an adverse effect on older employees and claiming retaliation after
they filed discrimination charges with the EEOC. Id. at 786; see also Dickson v.
Florida Dept. of Corrections, No. 5:9cv207-RH (N.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 1996). In
Dickson, a state employee filed suit in federal court and claimed age discrimination
when his employer failed to promote him. See id. He also claimed his employer
fired him in retaliation after he filed a discrimination report. See id.; see also Kimel
v. Florida Bd. of Regents, TCA 9540194 MMP (N.D. Fla. May 17, 1996).
126. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 638.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
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In the consolidated appeals13
constitutional authority to do so.
the Eleventh Circuit held the ADEA did not abrogate state
Eleventh Amendment immunity. ' A divided panel differed in the
basis for the decision. Judge Edmundson based his decision on his
belief that Congress did not intend to abrogate and found no clear
language that employees could sue a state in federal court.1 3' The
second judge, steering clear of Congressional intent, found
Congress did not have the authority under Section
five of the
14
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state immunity.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the
conflict among the circuit courts of appeal on the issue. 135 Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the Court in a five to four
decision, affirmed the court of appeal's decision.13 First, the
majority found "Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally
secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.' 3 3 The
Court cited the following language of 29 U.S.C. section 626(b) as
clear intent: "against any employer (including a public agency) in

130. See id.
131. The United States intervened to defend the ADEA's abrogation of state
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. at 639.
132. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1432 (11th Cir. 1998),
affid, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
133. See id. at 1430.
134. See id. at 1445.
135. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 639. Only one circuit, the Eighth Circuit, joined
the Eleventh Circuit in its view until Kimel. See Brief for Petitioner, at 14 n.13,
Kimel v. State of Fla. Bd. of Regents, 1999 WL 503876; see also Humenansky v.
Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 825, 827-28 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating
no express clear intent to abrogate and no Congressional power to abrogate).
The other eight circuit courts of appeal deciding the issue held the ADEA "clearly
and permissibly abrogates State immunity from suit in federal court." See
Petitioner's Brief, at 14 n.13; see also Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of
Ill., 141 F.3d 761, 766, 772 (7th Cir. 1998); Cooper v. New York State Office of
Mental Health, 162 F.3d 770, 774 (2d Cir. 1998); Coger v. Board of Regents, 154
F.3d 296, 307 (6th Cir. 1998); Keeton v. University of Nev. Sys., 150 F.3d 1055,
1057 (9th Cir. 1998); Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 1998);
Hurd v. Pittsburgh State Univ., 109 F.3d 1540, 1546 (10th Cir. 1997); Blanciak v.
Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 695 (3d Cir. 1996) (dictum); Ramirez v.
Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 700-01 (1st Cir. 1983); Arritt v. Grisell, 567
F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977).
136. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice
Thomas joined O'Connor in the majority. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 636.
137. See id. at 650.
138. Id. at 640 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)).
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any Federal or State court of competentjurisdiction." 9 The Court
rejected the Board's "ambiguity" arguments and decided the plain
language satisfied the stringent test.
The second prong of the test, whether Congress acted
pursuant to a valid exercise of constitutional authority, raised more
difficulty. 14' The state employees argued that Section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment granted Congressional authority to
abrogate state immunity from suit in federal court.'42 The Court
recognized the wide grant of authority Congress has "both to
remedy
and
to
deter
violation
of rights
guaranteed
thereunder ....,"4 At the same time, the Court emphasized the
same amendment served to limit Congressional power. 4 The
Court made its determination by applying the "congruence and
proportionality" test, which states: "[t]here must be a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end." 14
The Court
applied the test and concluded Congress did not have
constitutional authority under Section five of the Fourteenth
146
Amendment to abrogate state immunity under the ADEA. 4
Central to its holding, the Court reminded all that age is not a
suspect classification.
The Court in conclusion tried to offer
some consolation to state employees:
Our decision today does not signal the end of the line for
employees who find themselves
subject to age
discrimination at the hands of their state employers. We
hold only that, in the ADEA, Congress did not validly
abrogate the States' sovereign immunity to suits by private
individuals. State employees are protected by state age
discrimination statutes, and may recover money damages
from their state employers, in almost every State of the
Union. Those avenues of relief remain
available today,
48
just as they were before this decision.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See id.
See id. at 640-41.
Seeid. at 642.
See id. at 644.
Id.
See id.
Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
See id. at 645.
See id. at 645-46.
Id. at 650.
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Justice Stevens, dissenting in part, found little relief in the
statement.
Stevens found the majority's 'judicial activism"
offended Congressional federalism, and believed Congress acted
clearly and appropriately with states' best interests in mind. 5 °
D. The Eighth CircuitDecides a Matter of FirstImpression
5
In Cossette v. Minnesota Power & Light,1
1 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided an issue of first impression.15 At stake
were employee rights under the ADA. The Eighth Circuit held the
ADA protects victims of unauthorized medical condition
disclosures 153by an employer even though the employee is not
"disabled."
Diane Cossette held down two jobs, one with Minnesota Power
& Light and another as a waitress. While waitressing, Cossette fell
and injured her back, which in turn led to a finding of 10.5% total
disability. 5 5 Cossette continued working at Minnesota Power &
Light. 6 Three years after the accident, Cossette's supervisor,
without reason, suspected Cossette was mentally impaired. 1 The
supervisor ordered Cossette to undergo testing which showed
normal ranges of cognitive ability.'- 8 Another supervisor revealed
these perceived intellectual deficiencies to other employees.1 5 9 The
same supervisor also revealed Cossette's medical history to a
prospective employer, the United States Postal Service. 6 Due to
the unfavorable
reference, the Postal Service did not hire
6l
Cossette.
Cossette sued Minnesota Power & Light, asserting nine claims,

149. Joining Justice Stevens in dissent were Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. See id. (Stevens,J., dissenting in part).
150. See id. at 651-52.
151. 188 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 1999).
152. See id. at 969. One other Eighth Circuit district court answered the
question in the negative. See Adler v. I & M Rail Link, L.L.C., 13 F. Supp.2d 912,
935-37 (N.D. Iowa 1998).
153. See Cossette, 188 F.3d at 969.
154. See id. at 966.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 967.
160. See id.
161. See id. At the time Cossette brought the present suit she was working for
the Postal Service. See id.
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the most significant being illegal disclosure of confidential
information claim under the ADA.
The ADA protects employees
from an employer's unauthorized disclosure of the employee's
medical conditions.16 In an oral ruling, the district court granted
Minnesota Power 65& Light's motion for summary judgment.' 64
Cossette appealed.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals first addressed the district
court's finding that Cossette could not recover because she was not
"disabled within the meaning of the Act." 166 The district court
reasoned Cossette did not have a disability, therefore, the
unauthorized disclosures did not implicate the ADA.167 The court
of appeals disagreed.' 68 Unlike the ADA's prohibition on disability
discrimination, the disclosure of confidential information section
plainly suggests it applies to all "employees" and "applicants."' 69
The court cited decisions from other jurisdictions to further
support its position the claimant need not be disabled to bring a
claim for improper confidential disclosures.' 7° The court stated
that of significance was the fact Minnesota Power & Light did not
cite contrary authority at the federal circuit level to rebut Cossette's
interpretation."'
The court addressed a secondary issue on the requirement
that Cossette show actual tangible injury from the disclosure.
The court found Cossette created a genuine issue of material fact
when she showed she tested better than other applicants, yet the
Postal Service still passed her over. 73 Therefore, Minnesota Power
162. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(d) (3)-(4) (1994); see also Cossette, 188 F.3d at 968.
163. See42 U.S.C. § 12112(d).
164. See Cossette, 188 F.3d at 968. The trialjudge did not eliminate the claim of
confidential disclosures to employees in his written ruling. See id. After the court
of appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the trial judge granted summary
judgment for Minnesota Power & Light on the remaining claim. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.at 969.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id. Compare this assertion to the ADA's language on the general
prohibition that states employers shall not "discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994)) (emphasis supplied).
170. See Cossette, 188 F.3d at 969-70; see also Fredenburg v. Contra Costa County
Dep't of Health Serv., 172 F.3d 1176, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 1999); Griffin v. Steeltek,
Inc., 160 F.3d 591, 593-94 (10th Cir. 1998); Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain
Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 1997).
171. See Cossette, 188 F.3d at 970.
172. See id.
173. See id.
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& Light's disclosure to the Postal Service may have caused injury.
The court considered next the question of injury caused by the
supervisor's disclosure about Cossette's perceived intellectual
deficiencies to other Minnesota Power & Light employees. 7 5 On
that issue, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment for Minnesota Power & Light and remanded the issue
back to the district court. 76 However, the court did mention
"Cossette's claimed injury of being treated in a condescending and
patronizing manner falls short of an 'adverse employment action'
that would be required to establish a prima facie case of disability
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. section 12112(a)." 717

E. Minnesota Court of Appeals Assists Minnesota Human Rights
Claimants
The Minnesota Human Rights Act prohibits
....
178an employer from
discharging an employee because of a disability.
However, where
there is no direct evidence of discrimination, the plaintiff and
defendant have shifting burdens of proof in the case.7 9 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals on February 15, 2000 laid out the
standard courts should use for the plaintiffs burden in summary
judgment.180 In Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortgage Banking, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals adopted the standard followed by most
federal circuit courts and in the process produced a slightly easier
burden for claimants 81
Physicians diagnosed Dianne Hoover, a private mortgage
banker with more than twenty years experience, four of those years
spent at Norwest, with fibromyaligia, a disease with chronic pain
symptoms. 8 Hoover informed her employer of the diagnosis but
did not request special accommodations.
In the same year,
174. See id.
175. See id. at 971.
176. See id. at 972.
177. Id. at 971. The Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment on the retaliation claim. See id. at 972. The Court held the timing
between when Cossette filed the EEOC report and a unfavorable performance
evaluation was not enough to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See id.
178. See MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2) (b) (1998).
179. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
180. See Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortgage Banking, 605 N.W.2d 757, 760
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
181. See id. at 765.
182. See id. at 760.
183. See id.
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processing personnel informed Norwest of compliance problems in
Hoover's files.184 Norwest soon terminated Hoover.,11' Hoover then
filed a complaint against Norwest under the Minnesota Human
Rights Act (MHRA) .6
The district court granted Norwest's
summary judgment motion on all claims including the discharge
claim and failure to reasonably accommodate.""
The Minnesota Court of Appeals first laid out the test of
shifting burdens under the MHRA.'. First,
. the plaintiffs burden is
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
If the plaintiff
establishes the prima facie case, it is the employer's burden to
rebut the prima facie case by presenting evidence of a
nondiscriminatory, legitimate reason for the termination.' 90 If the
employer succeeds, the employee must show the employer's reason
for the adverse employment action is actually a pretext for
discrimination. 191
Hoover met the first element of her prima facie case when she
showed her twenty years of experience together with her positive
performance evaluations until the time of her discharge, otherwise
qualified her for the position.' 92 However, Hoover also had to show
a triable issue existed on her disability.'9" Norwest appropriately
conceded that fibromyaligia was an impairment under the
MHRA.
However, the MHRA requires more. 95 The impairment
must also "materially limit" a major life activity.' 96 To satisfy this
prong, Hoover had to show she was restricted in her ability to
perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs compared to the97
average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.
Norwest argued Hoover failed to show that she had applied for and
been denied a job because of her disability, therefore not
producing enough evidence to show where her impairment was
T

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See id. at 761.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 762.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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"materially limited.""'8 The court of appeals drew a distinction
between refusal-to-hire cases, that the requirement originated
from, and Hoover's situation.'9 "Requiring all disability plaintiffs
to show jobs for which they have applied and not been hired is too
broad an application of Carl Bolander."2°° In a move some
practitioners may call unusual, the court of appeals reversed the
district court and found Hoover met the prima facie case with a
vocational expert and medical opinion
evidence that she was
"materially limited" in work activities. 20 1
The court of appeals quickly found Norwest met its burden
when it rebutted Hoover's prima facie case with Hoover's failure to
comply with federal banking industry regulations. 202 The burden
then shifted back to Hoover to show that Norwest's reason was
merely a pretext for the discharge. 2° The court addressed next the
issue of what evidence Hoover must produce to survive summary
204
judgment.
Citing a conflict in the federal circuit courts of
appeals, the court chose between two standards; survival on
summary judgment required either: (1) "evidence that the
20 5
employers' articulated reason for discharge is unworthy of belief'
or (2) "in addition to demonstrating that the articulated reason is
unworthy of belief, the plaintiffs evidence of,,pretext must give rise
to an inference of intentional discrimination.
The court of appeals' split resulted from differing
interpretations of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks.20' The court recognized Minnesota courts
have applied the first, less stringent burden in the past, but have
not addressed it since Hicks in the summary judgment context.208
Relying on pre-Hicks court reasoning and the circuit majority
198. See id. at 763.
199. See id.
200. Id. at 764. The requirement for proof of job applications and denials
originated in Sigurdson v. Carl Bolander & Sons, Co., 532 N.W.2d 225, 228-29
(Minn. 1995).
201. See Hoover, 605 N.W.2d at 764.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 765
205. Id.
206. Id. The court points out there is an apparent split within the Eighth
Circuit. See Stanback v. Best Diversified Prod., Inc., 180 F.3d 903, 912 (8th Cir.
1999).
207. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
208. See Hoover, 605 N.W.2d at 765; Doan v. Medtronic, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 100,
105 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
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position, the Minnesota Court of Appeals accepted and adopted
the less stringent evidence burden. 2 The court did not require
the evidence to "support a reasonable inference of intentional
discrimination,"
an issue the plaintiff must ultimately prove at
210
trial.

Hoover presented evidence Norwest did not place a high
priority on compliance.2 Hoover also showed that Norwest knew
of other violators yet did nothing. 212 The court held Hoover met
the "unworthy of belief" standard and held that the district court
improperly granted summary judgment.2 13
BrianDockendorf

209. See Hoover, 605 N.W.2d at 765.
210. See id. at 765-66
211. See id. at 766.
212. See id.
213. See id. Showing the difficulty of prevailing, the court of appeals affirmed
summary judgment on Hoover's claims of failure to make a reasonable
accommodation, reprisal and the claim for negligent supervision. See id. at 766-68.
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